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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts-Actionable Fraud-Promissory Representations
In a recent North Carolina case,' the defendant was sued on a
conditional sales contract for the price of machinery bought by him.
Defendant admitted the execution of the contract but pleaded fraud in
the inducement of the contract, in that the plaintiff's agent had repre-
sented that the machinery would be better for the work of the defend-
ant, and would save defendant time and labor. Defendant claimed
that the machinery was far from what the agent had, represented it to
be. The court held these statements to be "... . promissory representa-
tions, looking to the future as to what the vendee can do with the
property, how much he can make on it, and, in this case, how much
he can save by the use of it, [and] are on a par with false affirmations
and opinions as to the value of property, and do not generally consti-
tute legal fraud."2  There was a dissent by three justices in this case
on the ground ". . . though the declarations may be clothed in the form
of opinions or estimates, when there is doubt as to whether they were
intended and received as mere expressions of opinion or as statements
of facts to be regarded as material, the question must be submitted to
the jury."3
The general rule, which is supported by numerous decisions in
almost all jurisdictions, is that fraud must relate to a present or pre-
existing fact, and cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled promises
or statements as to future events.4 While this general rule seems abso-
lutely clear in itself, the courts in dealing with cases in which an actual
' The American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Skinner, 225 N. C. 285, 34 S. E.
(2d) 190 (1945).
'id. at 290, 34 S. E. (2d) at 194.
3 Id. at 292, 34 S. E. (2d) at 195; See also Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft, 155
N. C. 63 at 66, 71 S. E. 61 at 62.
'McCormick v. Jackson, 209 N. C. 359, 182 S. E. 369 (1936) (applying
rule); Colt Co. v. Norwood, 202 N. C. 819, 161 S. E. 706 (1932) (applying
rule); Hotel Corp. v. Overman, 201 N. C. 337, 160 S. E. 289 (1931) (recogniz-
ing rule) ; Hinsdale v. Phillips, 199 N. C. 563, 155 S. E. 238 (1930.) (recognizing
rule); Shoffner v. Thompson, 197 N. C. 664, 150 S. E. 195 (1929) (applying
rule); Potter v. Miller, 191 N. C. 814, 133 S. E. 193 (1926) ; Erskine v. Chevrolet
Motors Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706, 32 A. L. R. 196 (1923) (recognizing
rule); Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Yelverton, 185 N. C. 314, 117 S. E. 299(1923) (recognizing rule); Pritchard v. Darley, 168 N. C. 330, 84 S. E. 392(1915); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908)(recognizing rule); Williamson v. Holt, 147 N. C. 515, 61 S. E. 384, 17 L. R.'A.(N.s.) 240 (1908) ; Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507, 16 L. R. A.(N.s.) 1121, 125 Am. St. Rep. 523 (1908); National 'Cash Register Co. v. Town-
send, 137 N. C. 652, 50 $. E. 306, 70 L. R. A. 349 (1905); Troxler v. New
Era Bldg. Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904) (recognizing rule); Hill v.
Gettys, 135 N. C. 373, 47 S. E.7449 (1904) (recognizing rule).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fraudulent intent existed have made various exceptions and limitations.
The weight of authority holds that fraud may be predicated on promises
made with an intention not to perform the same, or on promises made
without an intention of performance. 5 In these cases, the promisor
by implication asserts that there is a bona fide intention to perform,
and if this intention does not exist, there is a misrepresentation of a
-fact upon which fraud can be predicated. 6 It must be remembered
that the courts have held that the state of mind of a person at the time
he makes a promise is a fact, necessarily within the exclusive knowl-
edge of the promisor; therefore a misrepresentation of a state of mind
is a misrepresentation of a then existent fact. And so, fraud may be
predicated on a false representation as to what one thinks about the
occurrence of futhre events. In the principal case, the issue centered
around the "representations" of the plaintiff's agent as to the poten-
tialities of machinery. The pleadings do not bring into issue the state
of mind of the agent, and there is nothing in the opinion to indicate
that this was in question. If, at the time the agent made his statements
to the defendant, he did so knowing that the machinery would not do
the work, you would then have the question arise whether he, the agent,
was misrepresenting his state of mind-therefore, a possible ground
for fraud in the inducement of the contract. In Planters' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Yelverton7 the court said that as a general rule fraud
cannot be predicated upon promissory representations, because a promise
to perform an act in the future is not in the legal sense a representa-
tion, but that it may be predicated upon the nonperformance of a
promise when the promise is a device to accomplish the fraud.8
Even though the representations relate to the future, and the per-
'Mitchell v. Mitchell, 206 N. C. 546, 174 S. E. 447 (1934); Hinsdale v.
Phillips, 199 N. C. 563, 155 S. E. 238 (1930); Clark v. Laurel Park Estates,
196 N. C. 624, 146 S. E. 584 (1929); Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185
N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706, 32 A. L. R. 196 (1923) ; Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v.
Yelverton, 185 N. C. 314, 117 S. E. 229 (1923); White v. Fisheries Products
Co., 185 N. C. 68, 116 S. E. 169 (1923); Williams v. Hedgepeth, 184 N. C.
114, 113 S. E. 602 (1922); Herndon v. Durham & S. R. Co., 161 N. C. 650, 77
S. E. 683 (1913); Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507, 16 L. R. A.(x.s.) 1121, 125 Am. St. Rep. 523 (1908); Troxler v. New Era Bldg. Co.,
137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904); Hill v. Gettys, 135 N. C. 373, 47 S. E. 449
(1904); Blake v. Blackley, 109 N. C. 257, 13 S. E. 786, 26 Am. St. Rep.
566 (1891).
" A promise is usually without the domain of the law unless it creates a con-
tract, but if made when there is no intention of performance, and for the purpose
of inducing action by another, it is fraudulent, and may be made the ground
for relief. See Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706,
32 A. L. R. 196 (1923), Ierndon v. Durham & S. R. Co., 161 N. C. 650,
77 S. E. 683 (1913).
"185 N. C. 314, 117 S. E. 299 (1923).
8 This was a case of fraud inducing execution of a note for stock subscriptions,
consisting in representations that the maker of the note would never be called on
for any money, but that the note would be held until after a certain date, when
certain stock of the company would be offered for sale to discharge the note.
[Vol. 24
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son making them does not intentionally deceive the other party, it seems
that, if they are positively stated as facts by one who is in a position
to know, and whose duty it is to know, the truth, and are relied on to
his injury by one in ignorance of their falsity, they may be found to be
misrepresentations of fact on which fraud may be predicated. In White-
hurst v. Life Insurance Co.,9 there was evidence from which it seems
a jury might have inferred intentional fraud on the part of the repre-
sentor, but the decision does not seem to be based on this ground.
The representor was an insurance agent who, to induce one to take out
a policy of insurance, read over to the prospect, who was blind, a pro-
vision of the policy stating that, if the insured was living at the end
of ten years, the policy might be surrendered and the insured receive
the cash surrender value with interest; the agent explained to the
prospect that this meant that the company would, at the end of the
ten-year period, return the whole amount paid by him, with interest.
The court said it is not always required, for the establishment of action-
able fraud, that a false representation should be knowingly made; that
under certain conditions, if a party to a bargain avers the existence of
a material fact recklessly, or affirms its existence positively, when he is
consciously ignorant whether it is true or false, he may be held respon-
sible, and that this doctrine is expressly applicable where the parties
are not on equal terms with reference to the representations; that the
stipulations in the policy were to some extent ambiguous and indefinite,
and that it was a question for the jury as to whether the assurances
given by the agent were intended as statements of fact, accepted and
reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff as a material inducement to the
contract; that the verdict established actionable fraud imputable to the
insurance company, entitling plaintiff to recover the premiums paid
and interest.
If the party making the representations as to the future does not
believe the same, and the person to whom they are made does believe
them, and relies on them to his injury, it seems that they may be of
such a nature that they should be regarded merely as an expression of
opinion on which fraud cannot be predicated, unless there are special
circumstances, as superior knowledge on the part of the person making
ihe representations or confidential relations. The Whitehurst Case
was an example of persons on an unequal footing plus a quasi-confi-
dential relationship.
The doctrine that fraud may not ordinarily be predicated on an
unfulfilled promise or statement as to a future event finds application
or recognition.0 especially where the statements related were made to
9 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908).
"0 Hinsdale v. Phillips, 199 N. C. 563, 155 S. E. 238 (1930) (representations
1945]
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induce the purchase of land." It is held in Braddy v. Elliot12 that,
while a mere failure by one party to an exchange of land to comply
with his agreement to construct buildings on the land granted by him
is not sufficient to justify a rescission of the entire contract by a court
of equity, yet, if the promises are made without intent on the part of
the promisor to fulfill them, there is such fraud as will entitle the
other party to a rescission. So, it was held in Clark v. Laurel Park
Estates'3 that fraud warranting rescission of a contract for the pur-
chase of a lot in a subdivision might be predicated on representations
of the sales agents, made without intention of performance, as to im-
provements which would be made on or near the tract.
It seems evident that statements made by promoters to induce per-
sons to subscribe to stock must be accepted merely as expressions of
opinion on which fraud cannot be predicated in the event they are not
realized.' 4 Without discussion of the question, the court in the Planters'
Bank Case held that for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent,
evidence was admissible, in an action on notes given for the purchase
price of corporate stock, where, as an inducement to purchase the
stock, the sales agent represented to the purchaser that he would
never have to pay for the stock except from dividends therefrom, and
that the dividends would fully care for and pay off the purchase price.
Where there was a p;romise to hold notes given for subscription to
corporate stock until the maker of the notes sold a certain farm, and
to return the notes on failure to sell the farm, the North Carolina court
has held that if there is no intention of performance, fraud may be
predicated thereon.' 5
In National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend,'" the court said that
fraud may not ordinarily be predicated on a representation by the seller
as to pavements, sewer, and water system to be installed in tract of, land, made in
good faith and with an attempt to perform); Potter v. Miller, 191 N. C. 814,
133 S. E. 193 (1926) (promise by grantor to secure outstanding life estate for
the grantee); Williamson v. Holt, 147 N. C. 515, 61 S. E. 384, 17 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 240 (1908) (representation by vendor of ice plant that with some repairs
it would turn out about a certain amount of ice per day, the same being a mere
expression of opinion as to a future event, made to a vendee having knowledge
of the condition of the plant and full opportunity of investigation).
" Troxler v. New Era Bldg. Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904) (repre-
sentation, inducing sale of lot, that the vendee would erect thereon a building,
thereby enhancing the value of the vendor's other property).
2 146 N. C. 578, 60 S. E. 507, 16 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1121, 125 Am. St. Rep.
523 (1908).
196 N. C. 624, 146 S. E. 584 (1929).
Hotel Corp. v. Overman, 201 N. C. 337, 160 S. E. 289 (1931) (oral
representations to induce a subscription to stock in a hotel corporation, all
promissory in their nature) ; Pritchard v. Darley,' 168 N. C. 330, 84 S. E. 392(1915) '(representation as to the future value of, or profits to be derived from
stock).
"
5White v. Fisheries Products Co., 185 N. C. 68, 116 S. E. 169 (1923).
" 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306, 70 L. R. A. 349 (1905).
(Vol. 24
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a cash register that its use would save the expense of a bookkeeper
and half of a clerk's time. The court regarded such statements as
merely "dealer's talk," on which the purchaser could not safely rely.
It is said, however, that there was no evidence that the sales agent knew
that these statements were false when he made them. The court in the
principal case rely heavily on the Townsend Case as expressing the
general rule as to promissory representations; i.e., promissory represen-
tations do not constitute legal fraud. The majority opinion "without
going into a dialectic discussion of what may be a fact and what may
not be a fact . . ." holds as a matter of law that actionable fraud was
not present. 17 This seems to be the point on which the dissent dis-
agreed.' 8
The habit of vendors to exaggerate the value and suitability of their
articles is well known. A purchaser is certainly not justified in placing
substantial reliance on the seller's opinion as to the article in question.
Puffing of value as well as quality is an accepted part of bargaining.
transactions. But it seems obvious that the recipient is entitled to as-
sume that a representation of facts which are material in determining
his decision to engage or not to engage in a particular transaction is
honestly made, unless its falsity is obvious to his senses. A purchaser is
justified in assuming that even his vendor's opinion has some basis of
fact and therefore in believing that the vendor knows of nothing which
makes his opinion fantastic. In the Restatement of Torts the following
illustration is made:19
"A, in order to induce B to buy a heating device, states that it
will give a stated amount of heat while consuming only a stated amount
of fuel. B is justified in accepting A's statement as an assurance that
the heating device is capable of giving the services which A promises."
It would seem in the principal case that the vendee might have justi-
fiably relied on the vendor's statements ;20 and the question as to
whether these statements were opinion honestly made or mere puffing
would seem to be for the jury.
R. I. LIPTON.
7The American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Skinner, 225 N. C. 285, 290. 34
S. E. (2d) 190, 193 (1945).
" See Wolf Co. v. Smith Mercantile Co., 189 N. C. 322, 127 S. E. 208 (1925);
Case Threshing Machine Co. v. McKay, 161 N. C. 584, 77 S. E. 848 (1913);
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Bullock, 161 N. C. 1, 76 S. E. 634 (1912); Case
Threshing Machine Co. v. Freezer, 152 N. C. 516, 67 S. E. 1004 (1910).
"' g525, Illustration 2.
" See Note (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 90 on reliance on representation.
1945]
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Criminal Procedure-Effect upon Appeal of Plea of
Guilty in Recorders Court
Defendant was charged in a recorders court with assault with a
deadly weapon. He was without counsel and pleaded guilty. Upon
appeal to the Superior Court, from a judgment of two years' imprison-
ment, counsel for D sought to withdraw the plea of guilty entered
below. This motion was refused. On appeal questioning this ruling
it was held: That the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty was ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the Superior Court judge and could
not as a matter of right be withdrawn.' Three judges dissented and
were of the opinion that the statute controlling appeals from the par-
ticular recorders court involved entitled the D to enter an original
plea of not guilty. The majority purports to follow State v. Warren,2
which was a criminal case originating in a justice of the peace court.
There the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the use of profane language in
an area prohibited by statute. He was fined fifty dollars and appealed
to the Superior Court. The report of the case fails to show what his
plea was in the Superior Court; however, it is stated that the record
shows that D was found guilty by a jury. This would be inconsistent
with a plea of guilty. The Superior Court granted D's motion to
arrest judgment on the grounds that the statute under which he was
convicted was unconstitutional, and D's plea of guilty precluded him
from raising other questions. The dissent points out that the Warren
case did not directly raise the question here presented, and that the
original record in that case reveals that there was also a verdict by the
jury in the Superior Court.
Assuming that the cases raise the same question, the Warren case
would seem to be authority, since the statute regulating appeals from
the particular recorders court here involved8 and that regulating appeals
from a justice of the peace in criminal cases are similar.4 This com-
parison is accepted by the dissent.
Although the case is fundamentally one of statutory construction,
it involves the effect of a plea of guilty. Just what is the effect of
such a plea? A plea of guilty is a formal confession of guilt before
the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and differs from a volun-
'State v. Crandall, 225 N. C. 148, 33 S. E. (2d) 861 (1945).
2 113 N. C. 683, 18 S. E. 498 (1893).
'N. C. PuB. LOCAL LAWS (1911) c. 74 §7(e): "... and any person con-
victed in said court shall have the right to appeal to the Superior Court of
Beaufort County and upon such appeal the trial in the Superior Court shall
be de novo on papers certified from said recorders court."
'N. C. GEr. STAT. (1943) §15-17: "The accused may appeal from the
sentence of the justice to the Superior Court of the county. . . . In all such
cases of appeal, the trial shall be anew, without prejudice from the former
proceedings."
[VCol. 24
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taiy confession in that the latter is merely evidence of guilt.5 Such
a plea, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equiva-
lent of a conviction of the highest order. 6 The courts agree that once
the plea is accepted it is equivalent to a conviction in that the court
may give judgment thereon. It is when a plea of guilty is entered in
an inferior court, and the defendant is brought before a higher court
upon appeal, with the upper court looking back on the plea, that differ-
ences in a guilty plea and a conviction have been noted.
In this state a conviction in an inferior court cannot be used as
evidence of guilt when the defendant is tried anew upon appeal to the
Superior Court.7 On the other hand, when a defendant pleads guilty
in an inferior court the plea is admissable as evidence of defendant's
guilt on trial de novo in the Superior Court.8 Again, a defendant ap-
pealing from a conviction upon a plea of not guilty in an inferior court
must plead anew in the Superior Court,9 while under the doctrine of
the principal case, if a defendant pleads guilty in an inferior court
and appeals, he comes into the Superior Court with that plea.
Courts of other states have made further distinctions. A statute
requiring twenty-four hours delay between a conviction and sentence
does not apply to a plea of guilty.10 Where a physician or an attorney
pleads guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude, and in a separate
action to revoke his license, under a statute providing that same may
be done upon "conviction," the statute was held not to apply to a plea
of guilty before final judgment was entered thereon." 1 To the same
effect, where a statute provided a heavier penalty for persons previously
"convicted," and defendant had pleaded guilty on three previous occa-
sions and sentence had been suspended, it was held that he had not
been thrice convicted within the meaning of the statute.12
It is due to a guilty plea's conclusiveness, together with its collateral
and subsequent effect, that it is often stated that it should be accepted
with caution.' 3 The caution should be exercised in proportion to the
gravity of the offense. 14 At least three states require by statute that
State v. Branner, 149 N. C. 559, 63 S. E. 169 (1908).
' Marks v. People, 204 Ill. 248, 68 N. E. 436 (1903).7 State v. John Moore, 209 N. C. 44, 182 S. E. 692 (1935).
8 State v. Libby, 209 N. C. 363, 183 S. E. 414 (1936) ; State v. Ingram, 204
N. C. 557, 168 S. E. 837 (1933).
' State v. Lueders, 214 N. C. 558, 200 S. E. 22 (1938).
" State ex rel. Chicola v. Gen. Mgr. La. State Penitentiary, 188 La. 694,
177 So. 804 (1937).
" State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266, 79 S. W. (2d) 83 (1935);
ex parte Tanner, 40 Ore. 31, 88 P. 301 (1907).
" People ex rel. Marcley v. Lawes, 254 N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487 (1930).
" 4 BL. Comm. 329; Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 484 (deals with
withdrawals of pleas of guilty, but cites numerous authorities for the proposition
stated).
'" BisnoF, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, vol. 1, §795.
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the trial judge admonish the defendant before accepting his plea of
guilty, 15 and it has been held apart from any statutory provisions, that
the trial judge should give admonition to the effect of the guilty plea
before it is accepted and sentence given thereon.16 Other jurisdictions
leave to the discretion of the trial judge whether to accept or refuse
such a plea from the defendant, and in the absence of explanatory evi-
dence will presume that D understood the significance of his plea. 17
Since the effect of a plea of guilty gives its greatest difficulty when
a court is exercising a retrospective view of the plea, the problem
becomes in part one of the relationship between the inferior courts and
the Superior Court. The constitution allows the legislature to provide.
methods other than jury trials for petty misdemeanors, with the right
to appeal.' s Thus it is held that recorders courts are constitutional,
and a defendant's right to a jury trial is not denied when he is allowed
a jury trial in the Superior Court.' 9 Assuming that the right to a
jury trial is preserved by the constitutional right to an appeal, when
and under what circumstances may the right be waived? It may be
waived in the Superior Coukt by a plea of guilty entered there.20 The
defendant in a misdemeanor case may consent to a verdict of less
than twelve, and by not objecting to the entry in the record that it
was a verdict of a jury may estop himself to deny that he has had a
jury trial. 21 He may likewise waive the right by consenting to a
-judgment of an inferior court or by not appealing, although the statu-
tory time limit for the appeal has not run.2 2 Has a defendant who
pleads guilty in an inferior court waived this right? The dissent thinks
not where the statute defining the scope of the appeal from the in-
ferior court provides that ". . . upon such appeal the trial in the
Superior Court shall be de novo." The majority might have given a
short answer to the whole question by simply holding that the right
to a trial de novo, by the express terms of the statute, applied where a
defendant was convicted in the recorders court and had no application
' ILL ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934), c. 38, §732; COLO. STAT. ANN.
(Michie, 1935), c. 48, §482; TEXAS ANN. CODE CRIM. PRoC. (Vernon, 1938),
art. 501. Cf. MICE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936), §28-1058.2'Mislik v. State, 184 Ind. 72, 110 N. E. 551 (1915); Lowe v. State, 111
Md. 1, 73 A. 637, 24 L. R. A. (N.s.) 439, 18 Ann. Cas. 744 (1909); Hordzog
v. State, 47 Okla. 244, 293 P. 1107 (1930).
" State v. Ingram, 204 N. C. 557, 168 S. E. 837 (1933); State v. Hill, 81
W. Va. 676, 95 S. E. 21, 6 A. L. R. 687 (1918).
'
8 N. C. CoNs?. ART. 1, §13.
" State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E. 394 (1922); State v. Shine,
149 N. C. 480, 62 S. E. 1080 (1908).
2 State v. Branner, supra note 5.
" State v. Robert Wheeler. 185 N. C. 670, 116 S. E. 413 (1923).
2 State v. Lockey, 191 N. C. 571, 132 S. E. 570 (1926); State v. Pasley, 180
N. C. 695, 104 S. E. 533 (1920).
[ Vol. 24
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where the defendant pleaded guilty.2 3 It is evident that the court
did not intend to make any distinction between "conviction," as used
in the statute and a plea of guilty, for the decision purports to follow
a case where the appeal was from a justice of the peace. There the
relative statute provides that the defendant may appeal from the sen-
tence and upon such appeal the trial shall be anew, without prejudice
from the former proceedings.2 4 These latter provisions merely spell out
the. right to a trial de iwvo.
Where the statute provides for a trial de iwvo, just what do such
provisions mean? Generally de novo means anew, but 'it. is not so
broad in misdemeanor cases as to prevent a trial in the Superior Court
on the original warrants. 25 Neither are the warrants so binding as to
prevent amendments, 26 but they cannot be so amended as to charge a
new or a different offense.27 The Superior Court when considering a
case de novo may increase the punishment given below.2
3
When it comes to the effect of a plea of guilty entered below upon
the statutory provisions for an appeal and a trial de novo the courts
seem to have taken three views: (1) The right to appeal is non-
existent after such a plea is entered or is waived thereby. (2) The
right to appeal is not affected, but the guilty plea is retained in the
new trial. (3) The right to appeal is not affected and the defendant
may plead anew in the appellate trial.
The courts taking the first view are in keeping with the general
rule as stated by law encyclopedias that in a criminal case a party
cannot have a judgment properly entered on a plea of guilty reviewed
by appeal or error proceedings.29 Statutory or constitutional provi-
sions for an unrestricted appeal from the inferior court does not alter
the result. These courts treat the guilty plea as a waiver of the
existing right.3 0 Although these courts speak as if there is no right
of appeal after such plea is entered, some merely decide that the appeal
should be dismissed.3 ' Courts of this view make exceptions when the
. "Cf. People v. Brown, 87 Cal. 261, 286 P. 859 (1930). (Statute provided:
"If any person convicted of any criminal offense before any justice of the peace,
shall wish to appeal to the county court he or she shall . . . etc." Held: Statute
did not give right to an appeal when defendant pleaded guilty before the justice.)2 1 Supra note 4.
" State v. Boykin, 211 N. C. 407, 191 S. E. 18 (1937).
"' State v. Hunt, 197 N. C. 707, 150 S. E. 353 (1929); State v. Johnson,
188 N. C. 591, 125 S. E. 183 (1924) ; State v. Millis, 181 N. C. 530, 106 S. E.
677 (1921).
'7 State v. Goff, 205 N. C. 545, 172 S. E. 407 (1934).
" State v. Stafford, 113 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 256 (1893).
202 Am. JUR. 987; 2 R. C. L., Appeal and Error, §41.
"0 State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923); State v. Putnam, 121
Wash. 438, 209 P. 679 (1922).
8"Stokes v. State, 122 Ark. 56, 182 S. W. 521 (1916); Dudney v. State,
136 Ark. 453, 206 S. W. 898 (1918); Philpot v. State, 65 N. H. 250, 20 A. 955
(1890).
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case on appeal is one that the court thinks is meritorious. 32  The
weight of authority is against this view and will allow an appeal from
a court not of record where the statute provides for an unrestricted
appeal. 33
The courts taking the second view treat the plea of guilty and its
entry upon the record as the defendant's plea upon appeal, the effect
being to limit the appellate court's consideration to those things not
admitted by the plea of guilty. Perhaps the leading case for this
position is Commonwealth v. Mahoney,3 4 where Grey, C. J. said, "If
he pleads guilty on his first arraignment, and the plea is received by
the court and recorded, it is an admission of all the facts well charged
in the indictment or complaint and a waiver of his right to a jury trial
thereon." The difference between the first two views is that the first
makes the plea a waiver of the right to appeal while the second
makes it a waiver of the right to a jury trial.3 5 Courts adopting this
position make the same rule applicable to a plea of not guilty entered
below.3 6
The courts adopting the third view say the stated rule that a judg-
ment by confession cannot be reviewed on appeal is wholly inapplicable
to statutory appeals that are made triable -de novo. 37 This view was
taken by the Texas court in Ex parte Jones.38  There defendant had
pleaded guilty before a justice of the peace and appealed to the county
court. When the case was called in the county court the defendant
wanted to plead not guilty, but was denied the right to do so. The
Texas constitution provides that in all appeals from justice courts
there shall be a trial de novo. Upon appeal questioning this ruling by
the county court the Supreme Court said, "Without reviewing the stat-
utes and constitutions of those states whose courts have held contrary
to the view we entertain, we deem it only necessary to say, the language
of our constitution and statutes as above quoted are so plain as to
almost demand apology for an argument or any other citation. A trial
de novo literally is a trial from the beginning, as if no former trial
had been had." The same question was before the Florida court
3 Fletcher v. State, 12 Ark. 169 (1850); Nicley v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247,
94 S. E. 147 (1917).
33 State v. Stevens, 3 Harr. (Del.) 479, 139 A. 78 (1927) ; Yeager v. State,
197 Ind. 401, 131 N. E. 42 (1921); State v. Hedges, 67 Kan. 176, 72 P. 528
(1903); State v. Funderburk, 130 S. C. 352, 126 S. E. 140 (1925); Weaver v.
Kimball, 59 Utah 72, 202 P. 9 (1921) ; Duckerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787,
173 S. E. 543 (1934).
"115 Mass. 151 (1874).
' State v. Down, 41 Idaho 199, 239 P. 279 (1925); Doench v. State, 89 Ind.
52, 165 N. E. 777 (1929).
3" Cline v. State, 25 Ind. 331, 58 N. E. 210 (1900); Commonwealth v. Blake,
94 Mass. 188 (1865).
Jenkins v. State, 173 Miss. 546, 54 So. 158 (1911).
" 128 Tex. Cr. App. 380, 81 S. W. (2d) 706 (1935).
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in State v. Frederick.3 9 The Florida constitution provides: "Appeal
from justice of the peace courts in criminal cases may be tried de novo
under such regulation as the legislature may prescribe." Pursuant to
this provision the legislature provided that the circuit court should
try all cases on appeal from justice of the peace courts de novo as
though the proceeding had been originally begun in the circuit court.
The defendant pleaded guilty of assault and battery before a justice,
was given four months in jail, and appealed to the circuit court, where
his appeal was dismissed. Considering a petition for a writ of man-
damus directing the circuit court judge to reinstate the case the
Supreme Court said, "The right to appeal and demand a trial de novo
in the circuit court from a justice of the peace court conviction is
entirely regulated by statute. The statute imposes no limitation on
the right to appeal such as to confine the right only to those who have
pleaded not guilty. . . . Justice of the peace courts in Florida are not
courts of record. On the contrary they proceed with utmost in-
formality. For the latter reason such courts are best made to serve
the purpose of justice through according to the accused an uncondi-
tional trial de novo in the circuit court under proper forms of accusa-
tions and before a judge and jury of the highest degree of capability."
The Virginia court, when confronted with the question in Dickerson
v. Commonwealth,40 reversed a former opinion in keeping with the
first view and adopted the third stated view. The circuit court had
dismissed defendant's appeal from a justice of the peace where he had
pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court when considering this ruling held
that the statutes there neither expressly nor by implication limit the
right to appeal to persons, convicted upon a plea of not guilty. The
case was remanded to the circuit court for a trial de novo with the
right to the accused to withdraw his plea of guilty. Courts adopting
this view are of the opinion that the former proceedings must be dis-
regarded and find this to be the legislative intent in providing for
unrestricted appeals and de novo trials.41
It is submitted that in the principal case if the statute is construed
to mean the same as statutes governing like situations from justice of
the peace courts the dissent is supported by the greater and better
authority.
CYRUs F. LEE.
124 Fla. 290, 168 So. 252 (1936).
"0 Supra note 33.
"1 People v. Richmond, 57 Mich. 399, 24 N. W. 124 (1885).
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Criminal Law-Deadly Weapons-
Classification in North Carolina
The problem of the classification of instrumentalities used in the
perpetration of assaults as deadly weapons and the added question of
whether this classification should be made by judge or jury, provide
an extensive and often intricate subject of research for the attorney
seeking information concerning this branch of the criminal law. For-
tunately for the North Carolina practitioner, the Supreme Court of this
state has from the time of its original consideration of these questions
laid down and adhered to sound fundamental rules and distinctions in
determining the deadliness of a weapon. It is the purpose of the writer
to enumerate these distinctions and to cite cases illustrative of each.'
The first general classification of deadly weapons is that into which
fall those instruments which are deadly per se. In State v. West 2 the
court enumerated as weapons deemed in law to be deadly a gun, a
sword, a large knife or bar of iron, or any other heavy instrument by
a blow from which a grievous hurt would probably be inflicted. In a
later case3 the court named a pistol and a dirk-knife as instruments
which are of themselves deadly.
Where the indictment, under a count for assault with a deadly
weapon, stated merely that the assault had been made with "a club,"
the court held that the term "club" ex vi terndni imputed a deadly
weapon. 4 So also, the mere description of the weapon as an axe,
I N. C. PuB. LAWS 1919, c. 101, expressly made assault with a deadly weapon
punishable as a felony. The original legislation on this point was under chapters
seven and eight of N. C. PuB. LAWS of 1869-70, wherein assault with a deadly
weapon without intent to kill was made punishable by imprisonment in the
State's prison not to exceed five years, 'and assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill by imprisonment not exceeding ten years. These two sections
were repealed by Chapter 43 of N. C. PuB. LAws of 1870-71, and no further
legislation on this point took place until that of 1919.
There seems to be some conflict as to the gravity of the offenses of assault
with or without a deadly weapon under the 1868-69 provisions. In State v.
Swann, 65 N. 1C. 330 (1871), the court held that the offense of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, under the legislation of 1869-70, was not a
felony. However, in State v. Bentley, 223 N. C. 563, 27 S. E. (2d) 738 (1943),
Mr. Justice Seawell, in a review of this legislation, stated that the laws of
1870-71 reduced the offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, and he cited
State v. Tyson, 223 N. C. 492, 27 S. E. (2d) 113 (1943) and State v. Smith,
174 N. C. 804, 93 S. E. 910 (1917) as supporting this position.
It would seem that much of this uncertainty arises from the fact that it was
not until 1891 that the General Assembly classified as a felony any crime punish-
able by death or imprisonment in the State's prison, for the Swaun case was
decided before this classification was established. The Bentley case appears to
be the latest authority on the point, and therefore determinative of the question
as now presented.
For a general discussion of the classification of crimes see, Coates, Punish-
ment for Crime in North Carolina (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 205.
251 N. C. 506 (1859).
'State v. Huntley, 91 N. C. 617 (1884); State v. Brewer, 98 N. C. 607, 3
S. E. 819 (1887).
' State v. Phillips, 104 N. C. 786, 10 S. E. 463 (1889).
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without any further description in the indictment, has been held to be
sufficient to charge assault with a deadly weapon. 5 The court has
also likened a blackjack to a shotgun or pistol which ex vi termini
import their deadly character.6
The number of weapons which from their very nature may be
termed deadly, however, is comparatively few. More often the weapon
attains the status of a deadly one through the circumstances of its use.
Whether or not death results from the use of a weapon is not the
determining factor as to its deadliness. It appears clear that weapons
which are per se deadly may not always inflict fatal injuries, while an
instrument which does not possess inherently deadly qualities may
become deadly by the use which is made of it.
When the deadliness of the weapon must be deduced from the cir-
cumstances of use, proper consideration should be given to the size
and nature of the weapon, the manner in which it is used, and the size
and strength of the assailant and the assaulted.7 When there is con-
troversy as to these circumstances, the issue of the deadliness is gen-
erally one of law to be determined by the court.8 In State v. Smith0
the Supreme Court upheld the action of the court below in determining
as a question of law that a baseball bat, if viciously used, was a deadly
weapon. The opinion stated that where the alleged deadly weapon and
its manner of use are of such character as to admit of but one con-
clusion, the question is one of law, and the court must take the responsi-
bility of so declaring.
However, where the weapon may or may not produce death or
bodily harm, according to the manner of its use, the part of the body
at which the blow was aimed, and the relative size and condition of
the parties, the question of the deadliness of the instrument is one of
fact for the determination of the jury.10 This rule was laid down in
one of the earliest reported North Carolina cases involving the determi-
nation of the deadliness of a weapon.': There a piece of curled hickory
about the size of a walking cane, used by a person much older and larger
than the assailed, was held to be a deadly weapon, the court stating that
it fell peculiarly within the province of the jury to ascertain whether
such a weapon, in the hands of the particular assailant, and in the
method in which it was used, was likely to produce fatal consequences.
State v. Shields, 110 N. C. 497, 14 S. E. 779 (1892).
State v. Hefner, 199 N. C. 778, 155 S. E. 879 (1930).
' State v. Sinclair, 120 N. C. 603, 27 S. E. 77 (1897).
' State v. Collins, 30 N. C. 407, 413 (1848) ("Whether the instrument used
was such as is described by the witnesses, where it is not produced, or, if pro-
duced, whether it was the one used, are questions of fact; but, these ascertained,
its character is pronounced by law.") ; State V. Speaks, 94 N. C. 865- (1886).
0 187 N. C. 469, 124 S. E. 737 (1924).
"'State v. Watkins, 200 N C. 692, 158 S. E. 593 (1931).
" State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. 76 (1840).
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To the same effect was the later case of State v. Huntley,12 where
a switch the thickness of a woman's little finger was found by a jury
to be a deadly weapon because it was applied violently and repeatedly
by the defendant upon the back of his frail wife. The Supreme Court,
taking into consideration the violence of the attack and the physical
advantage of the aggressor, upheld the finding of the jury.18
Perhaps the most striking example of how the manner of use of
the instrument and the subject upon which it is used may determine its
deadly nature is the case of State v. Norwood.14 There the defendant
was indicted for the murder of her infant child, the death being caused
by pushing two pins down the child's throat. In finding no error on
the part of the court below in submitting the question of deadliness to
the jury, the Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the Huntley
case, supra, in holding that the question of whether an instrument is a
deadly weapon depends not infrequently more upon the manner of its
use than upon the intrinsic character of the instrument itself. It appears
clear that death might reasonably be expected to ensue from the push-
ing of a pin down the throat of an infant.
In the majority of the cases where the relative strength and size
of the parties to the assault are considered in the determination of the
question of the deadliness of the weapon used, the assailant's physical
advantage is evident, and the obvious lack of inherent deadliness in the
weapon is overcome by that factor. However, in the case of State v.
Sinclair'5 was demonstrated the converse of that situation. There the
assailant was a feeble, sickly boy of seventy-five or eighty pounds,
while the victim of the assault was a full-grown man who was being
held by two other men. The instrument used was a piece of pine
weather boarding five to six inches wide, a quarter of an inch thick,
and fourteen to eighteen inches long. It appears that the sole injury in-
flicted was a bruise on the assailed's leg. In holding the instrument
not to be deadly, the court took into consideration the size and nature
of the weapon, the manner in which it was used, the size and strength
of the party using it, and the person upon whom it was used. The test
seems particularly applicable and well applied here,
In the case of State v. Watkins16 the Supreme Court held as error
the instruction of the lower court that an assault when made with an
instrument such as a pair of handcuffs would constitute in law an
22 91 N. C. 617 (1884).
" A two and a half foot piece of buggy trace has also been held to be a
deadly weapon where the assailant was a strong, robust man and the victim was
a frail, weak woman. State v. Archbell, 139 N. C. 537, 51 S. E. 801 (1905).2,115 N. C. 789, 20 S. E. 712 (1894).
25120 N. C. 603, 27 S. E. 77 (1897).
16200 N. C. 692, 158 S. E. 593 (1931).
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assault with a deadly weapon, the handcuffs not being presented in evi-
dence and no evidence being introduced as to their size, weight, charac-
ter or manner of use. Mr. Justice Clarkson dissented vigorously, bas-
ing his contention for the deadliness of the weapon largely upon the
proven physical incapacity of the victim at the time of the assault, it
appearing that he was then suffering acutely from heat prostration and
that he died therefrom twelve hours after the assault.
The two most recent cases on the question of determination of the
deadliness of a weapon are State v. Davis1 7 and State v. Harrison.'8
In both of these cases, the former involving a hoe and the latter an ice
pick, the trial judge charged the jury that the weapon was deadly
per se, although there was no further particular description of either
instrument in the indictments, and upon neither trial was the weapon
presented for inspection by either judge or jury. In both cases the
Supreme Court held the charge to be erroneous, and held that the ques-
tion of the deadliness of the weapon should have been submitted to the
jury under proper instructions. It would appear that the safest method
of determining the question of deadliness, where the trial court is un-
certain of whether the weapon is deadly per se, is to submit the ques-
tion to the jury under instructions directing them to consider the matter
of its use as well as other circumstances attending the assault and rele-
vant to the question. For if the weapon is deadly per se, and the jury
decides the question of deadliness in the affirmative, the failure to so
instruct them will be cured by verdict.
Thus it can be seen that the court of last resort of North Carolina
has provided clear and sensible guideposts for both the practicing law-
yer and the trial judge, both of whom are faced so frequently with the
question of the deadliness of a weapon in the prosecution of criminal
offenses. It is an ever present possibility that some new and previously
unclassified instrumentality may come before the court for classifica-
tion. But when that event occurs, the likelihood of a proper determina-
tion of the question in the court below is greatly increased by its ability
to resort to such a long and unwavering line of well-considered au-
thority.
CHARLES F. COIRA, JR.
Automobiles-Recording of Liens-
Certificate of Title
Expanding production of new automobiles and its stimulation of
trading in used cars renews interest in the legal problems of the sale and
distribution of automobiles on credit. A timely reexamination of the
7222 N. C. 178, 22 S. E. (2d) 274 (1942).
"225 N. C. 234, 34 S. E. (2d) 1 (1945).
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law applicable to these credit transactions will bring to light instahces
in which the law has failed to keep pace with the economics of install.
ment selling. It is the purpose of this note to review one such instance,
and to suggest remedial legislation.
The chief instruments of installment selling are conditional sale
contracts and chattel mortgages, both of which are devices designed to
give the seller security title' until the purchase price is paid, and the
buyer possession and use of the car while paying for it. By statute
in North Carolina both chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts
must be recorded.2 The purpose of recording is to publish notice of
the divided ownership of the property, to protect creditors or purchasers
of the mortgagor from secret liens and encumbrances ;8 and to accom-
plish this the processes of recordation, and its corollary, investigation,
must be simple, convenient and consistent with sound business prac-
1 Or, in some states, a lien only. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES & CONDITIONAL
SALES (6th ed. 1933) §1.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "No deed of trust or mortgage for real
or personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors
or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mort-
gagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county
where the land lies; or in case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or
mortgagor resides; or in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of
the state, then in the county where said personal estate, or some part of the
same, is situated; or in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee, or
mortgagee resides. For the purposes mentioned in this section the principal
place of business of a domestic corporation is its residence."
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-23: "All conditional sales of personal property
in which the title is retained by the bargainor shall be reduced to writing and
registered in the same manner, for the same fees and with the same legal effect
as is provided for chattel mortgages, in the county where the purchaser resides,
or, in case the purchaser shall reside out of the state, then in the county where
the personal estate or some part thereof is situated, or in case of choses in
action, where the donee, bargainee or mortgagee resides." By construction and
extension of the language of §47-23 the court has developed the rule that con-
ditional sales are in legal effect chattel mortgages in North Carolina. Hether-
ington & Sons, Ltd. v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713 (C.C.A. 4th, 1928) ; Union Trust
Co. v. Southern Sawmills Co., 166 Fed. 193, 200 (C.C.A. 4th, 1908); Grier v.
Weldon, 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E. 200 (1933) ; State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829,
167 S. E. 63 (1925); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130
S. E. 319 (1925); Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918);
Piano Co. v. Kennedy, 152 N. C. 196, 67 S. E. 488 (1910); Hamilton v. High-
lands, 144 N. C. 279, 56 S. E. 929 (1907) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 121 N. C.
168, 28 S. E. 257 (1897) ; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99
(1894); Butts v. Screws, 95 N. C. 215 (1886); Note (1943) 21 N. C. L. REv.
387, 390. Whether the full implications of this view will be realized and followed
for all purposes, it is clear that in matters of registration conditional sales will
be treated as chattel mortgages. Therefore, throughout this note the terms
"mortgage," "mortgagee" and "mortgagor" will include respectively, "condi-
tional sale contract," "conditional vendor" and "conditional vendee." On the
distinction between chattel mortgages and conditional sales generally see JONES,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§26-33(b), pp. 937-48; Magill, The Legal Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Various Methods of Selling Goods on Credit (1923)
8 'CoRN. L. Q. 210.
'Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 13,o67 S. E. 48, 51 (1910) ; Empire Drill Co.
v. Allison, 94 N. C. 548, 553 (1886); Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191, 192
(1885) ; Blevins v. Barker, 75 N. C. 436, 438 (1876) ; JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 1
J§190, 1004; WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §327.
[Vol. 24
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tices. Tested by these considerations the present North Carolina re-
cording statutes are unsatisfactory in their application to the sale or
mortgage of motor vehicles.
In this jurisdiction the registration of mortgages on real and per-
sonal property has been held of prime importance,4 and a strict applica-
tion of the necessity and effect of recording has prevailed. Although
the stated purpose of registration is notice of the mortgage lien,5 regis-
tration acting as constructive notice, the settled and oft-quoted rule in
this state is that no actual notice, however full and formal, will supply
the place of registration. 6 Nor will a reference in a mortgage to a
prior unregistered lien establish the validity of that lien in law,7 unless
the mortgage is expressly made subject to the earlier lien.8 Thus,
though registration is not necessary to the validity of the mortgage
between the parties,9 failure to register, or delayed or defective regis-
tration, has severe consequences. The seller loses his security interest
to creditors'0 or purchasers for value" from the buyer-mortgagor,
'Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 157, 159, 144 S. E. 835, 837, 838
(1928).
' Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584, 588 (1843).
'Brown v. Burlington Hotel Corp., 202 N. C. 82, 161 S. E. 735 (1931);
Threlkeld v. Land Co., 198 N. C. 186, 151 S. E. 99 (1929); Fertilizer Co. v. Lane,
173 N. C. 184, 91 S. E. 953 (1917); Springs v. Cole, 171 N. C. 418, 88 S. E.
721 (1916); Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903); Blalock v.
Strain, 122 N. C. 283, 29 S. E. 408 (1898); Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C.
358 (1874); Notes (1931) 72 A. L. R. 165, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 274. However,
a mortgagee who takes possession of the property to enforce his lien before
any subsequent rights attach has a valid prior lien, such possession taking the
place of recorded notice. Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925).
Cf. Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 566 (1932).
'Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161 S. E. 212 (1931); Lawson v. Key,
199 N. C. 664, 155 S. E. 570 (1930); Story v. Slade, 199 N. C. 596, 155 S. E.
256 (1930); Hardy v. Abdallah, 192 N. C. 45, 133 S. E. 195 (1926); Blacknall
v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369, 109 S. E. 72 (1921) ; Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C.
168, 63 S. E. 723 (1909).
' Hardy v. Fryer, 194 N. C. 420, 139 S. E. 833 (1927) ; Avery County Bank
v. Smith, 186 N. C. 635, 120 S. E. 215 (1923) ; Bank v. Vass, 130 N. C. 590,
41 S. E. 791 (1902); Brasfield v. Powell, 117 N. C. 140, 23 S. E. 106 (1895);
Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. C. 28, 8 S. E. 890 (1889)
' General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928); Dry-Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564 (1916);
Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188, 13 S. E. 770 (1891); Butts v. Screws,
95 N. C. 215 (1886) ; Deal v. Palmer, 72 N. C. 582 (1875) ; Leggett v. Bullock,
44 N. C. 283 (1853). And the widow or personal representative of deceased
mortgagor stands in his shoes. McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204(1910); Hinkle v. Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34 S. E. 554 (1899); Williams v.
Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886). An unregistered mortgage is good against sheriff's
seizure of automobile for illegal use by mortgagor without knowledge of mort-
gagee. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 799(C.C.A. 4th, 1928); South Georgia Motor Co. v. Jackson, 184 N. C. 328,
114 S. E. 478 (1922); Skinner v. Thomas, 171 N. C. 98, 87 S E. 976 (1916).
"0 Creditors include those obtaining a lien by attachment, execution, or other
proceeding, but not general creditors. Elk Creek Lumber Co. v. Hamby, 84
F. (2d) 144 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936); In re Cunningham, 64 F. (2d) 296 (C.C.A. 4th,
1933); National Bank of Goldsboro v. Hill, 226 Fed. 102 (E.D.N.C. 1915);
Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343 (1876). Receivers in insolvency proceedings
are creditors. National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Price, 195 N. C. 602, 143 S. E.
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even if these outside parties had full knowledge of the encumbrance.
And the buyer-mortgagor may lose his possession and interest in the
car or have to pay the claims of prior lienors. If the recording acts
are to be rigorously enforced it is imperative that they provide a system
suited to modern conditions.
While local registration is perfectly adapted to mortgages on real
property, it has not solved the problem of the movable chattel, specifi-
cally, the automobile.' 2 Like many states, 13 North Carolina requires
registration of a chattel mortgage in the county where the purchaser
resides, or in the case of an out of state purchaser the county where
the chattel is situated.14 Such registration is not in fact adequate
notice or protection against fraud. It is too easy for the mortgagor to
sell the car in another county or state, representing it to be unencum-
bered.15 It is too difficult for the prospective purchaser or creditor to
search the records of several counties to uncover liens.1 6 And if
208 (1928); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508,
142 S. E. 767 (1928); Yelverton Hardware Co. v. Garage Co., 184 N. C. 125,
113 S. E. 601 (1922); Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526
(1917). Section 70(c) of the National Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 879 (1938),
11 U. S. C. §110(c) (1940), gives a trustee in bankruptcy the status of lien orjudgment creditor. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1942) §§70.56-8.
"1 Purchasers for value include subsequent mortgagees. Wallace v. Cohen,
111 N. C. 103, 15 S. E. 892 (1892); Southerland v. Fremont, 107 N. C. 565,
12 S. E. 237 (1890); Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C. 431, 6 S. E. 370 (1888);
Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885); Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 235 (1878);
Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343 (1876); Potts v. Blackwell, 57 N. C. 58 (1858).
Assignees for benefit of creditors are purchasers for value. Cowan v. Dale,
189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925); Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C. 323, 98
S. E. 818 (1919). But a tort-feasor against the mortgaged chattel is neither
purchaser nor creditor. Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130
S. E. 319 (1925). In Wallace v. Benner, 200 N. C. 124, 156 S. E. 795 (1930)
the registration statute was held not to defeat application of the doctrine of
equitable subrogation of lien in favor of one advancing money to pay off existing
mortgage liens upon the property. Cf. Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369,
109 S. E. 72 (1921).
12 Note (1939) A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration, 48
YALE L. J. 1238.
jONES, op. cit. supra note 1, §§190, 1008 et seq.
14 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 23; See also Industrial Discount Corp. v.
Radecky, 205 N. C. 163, 170 S. E. 640 (1933) (residence means actual residence
and not domicile); Ward v. Southern Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. (2d) 773
(M.D.N.C. 1929) (foreign corporation has no residence in state regardless of
location of its principal place of business).15Compare Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588(1936) with Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891). N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §14-114 makes the fraudulent disposal of mortgaged property
by the mortgagor a misdemeanor. See (1940) 26 VA. L. Rxv. 1074 commenting
on Virginia statute requiring filing of liens on motor vehicle certificate of title.
On the problems of recordation in confliot of laws: JoNEs, op. cit. stupra note
1, §§260, 1158-61; WIu.IsToN, op. cit. supra note 4 §339; Notes (1938) 17
N. C. L. REv. 56, (1928) 41 HAgv. L. REv. 779, (192) 6 MINN. L. REv. 153,
(1934) 6 Miss. L. J. 416; (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 111; (1929) 13 MINN. L.
REv. 724; (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 749.
1 A properly recorded mortgage need not be recorded again in the county
to which the property is removed by the mortgagor. Barrington v. Skinner,
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recording is in the wrong county, which is not unlikely in view of
shifting residences and shifty buyers, the mortgagee is at the mercy
of parties dealing with the mortgagor. 17
Out of the complex security transactions of dealers, manufacturers
and finance companies' 8 rises one of the most vexing situations in this
field-the clash between a recorded mortgage on-the dealer's cars and a
sale to an innocent purchaser from the stock in trade. Recognizing
the common failure to check dealers' titles and the hindrance to busi-
ness such checking would occasion, most courts protect the purchaser
without actual notice by finding an express or implied agency in the
dealer to sell free of the mortgage lien, or an estoppel against the mort-
gagee's enforcement of the lien. 19 North Carolina has applied the
agency doctrine,20 but not the broader principle of estoppel.2 1
Since defective registration is no registration at all, sellers or mort-
gagees may find themselves ensnared by technical pitfalls in the record-
ing process. Chattel mortgages and conditional sale agreements must
be acknowledged and probated before registration,2 2 and proper index-
117 N. C. 47, 23 S. E. 90 (1895); Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 6, 10 S. E.
127 (1889). A few states permit filing of mortgages on movable chattels with
the secretary of state, thus making them effective anywhere in the state. Legis.
(1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 635, 639.
'In re Franklin, 151 Fed. 642 (E.D.N.C. 1907) (mortgagor had no fixed
place of residence and recording in county where mortgage executed was proper) ;
Sloan Bros. v. Sawyer-Felder Co., 175 N. C. 657, 96 S. E. 39 (1918) (Georgia
mortgage of truck located in N. C. not recorded in N. C.); Bank of Colerain
v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) (mortgage of sawmill and fixtures
registered in county where mill located); Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C. 431;
6 S. E. 370 (1888) (mortgage of stock of goods of branch store registered in
county where store located).
" See Adelson (1935) The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PRo. 218. The article states that large finance companies find
it more economical to set up a reserve against losses to third parties from failure
to record than to comply with recording statutes. Myerson (1935) Practical
Aspects of Some Legal Problems of Sales Finance Companies, 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PaoB. 244, at 250.
1 Fogle v. General Credit, 122 F. (2d) 45 (App. D. C. 1941), 136 A. L. R.
814, 821 (1942); (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 334; '(1939) 23 Mx xN. L. R~v. 846;(1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 837; (1930) 2 Rocxy MT. L. Rxv. 261; (1940) 3
U. OF DETROIT L. J. 152; (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 755.
"Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Young, 224 N. C. 89, 29 S. E. (2d) 29 (1944);
Merritt v. Kitchin, 121 N. C 148, 28 S. E. 358 (1897) ; Etheridge v. Hilliard,
100 N. C. 250, 6 S. E. 571 (1888) ; Bynum v. Miller, 89 N. C. 393 (1883).
"' Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928); Rogers v.
Booker, 184 N. C. 183, 113 S. E. 671 (1922); Note (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 306;
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 573. The purchaser from the mortgagor without knowl-
edge of the recorded mortgage may be sued by the mortgagee for conversion.
Whitehurst v. Nixon, 196 N. C. 823, 146 S. E. 599 (1929).
"N. C. GE.N. SaT. (1943) §§47-1 through 47-17; National Bank of Golds-
'boro v. Hill, 226 Fed. 102 (E.D.N.C. 1915) ; Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128
S. E. 155 (1925); Best v. Utley, 189 N. C. 356, 127 S. E. 337 (1925) ; Allen v.
Stainback, 186 N. C. 75, 118 S. E. 903 (1923) ; Lance v. Tainter, 137 N. C. 249,
49 S. E. 211 (1904); Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, 35 S. E. 1035 (1900);
Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99 (1894); Long v. Crews,
113 N. C. 256. 18 S. E. 499 (1893); White v. Connelly, 105 N. C. 65, 11 S. E.
177 (1890) ; Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 235 (1878); Starke v. Etheridge, 71 N
C. 240 (1874).
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ing and cross-indexing are essential parts of registration. 23 On the
other hand, recording within a specified time limit is not required, the
instrument simply taking effect against subsequent parties from the
date and hour of recordation. 2 4  And as recording ig good until can-
cellation of the mortgage, or the expiration of fifteen years, 2 5 renewal
during the life of the average car is unnecessary.
If a different method of registering automobile liens were available,
one which provided central registration for the whole state, simplified
the procedure of registration and investigation, and combined actual
notice through documents in common use in the trade with construc-
tive notice through recording in one place, would its adoption not be
highly desirable? As a matter of fact, the fundamentals of such a
system exist at present in the provisions of the North Carolina Motor
Vehicle Act 26 requiring a certificate of title for every automobile oper-
ated on the public highways, 27 and without major change this Act can
supersede the general recording acts in their application to mortgages
on this class of extremely mobile chattels.
Every owner28 must apply to the department of motor vehicles for
registration of his automobile and issuance of a certificate of title.29
The department has. broad powers to investigate the genuineness and
legality of the application, 80 and may refuse registration for stated
causes, one of which is a reasonable belief that issuance of the certifi-
cate would constitute a fraud against the rightful owner or lienor.31
The certificate contains owner's name and address, date of issuance,
28 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §161-22; Tocci v. Nowfall, 220 N. C. 550, 18
S. E. (2d) 225 (1941); Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 196 S. E. 352(1938); Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161 S. E. 212 (1931); Story v.
Slade, 199 N. C. 596, 155 S. E. 256 (1930); Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C.
154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928); Merchant & Farmers Bank v. Harrington, 193
N. C. 625, 137 S. E. 712 (1927); Fowle v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639(1918); Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S. E. 543 (1918); (1938) 52 HARV.
L. REv. 170. For a justification of courts' demands for strict compliance with
the statutory details of recording, see (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 351.
"'Blacdnall v. Hancock, 182 N. C. 369, 109 S. E. 72 (1921); Carolina-
Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee Riv. Power Co., 175 N. C. 668, 96 S. E.
99 (1918); McKinnon v. McLean, 19 N. C. 79 (1836); Davison v. Beard, 9
N. C. 520 (1823).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-37(5).
"Id. §§20-38 through 20-84; 220-3.
" Certain vehicles are exempt from the registration and certificate of title
requirements, for example, federal government vehicles, cars brought into the
state by non-residents under reciprocity permission, farm tractors and other farm
implements, and new cars held by manufacturers or dealers for sale. N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §20-51.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-38(t) defines owner to include conditional
vendee and chattel mortgagor.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-50, 20-52. The application must bear the
written signature of the owner, acknowledged by him before a person authorized
to administer oaths.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-44 through 20-46.
31 Id. §20-54.
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description of the car, and "a statement of the owner's title and of all
liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle therein described, and whether
possession is held by the owner under a lease, contract or conditional
sale, or other like argreement. '32  Where liens exist the certificate is
mailed to the holder of the first lien, to be retained until payment.33
Certificates remain valid until cancelled by the department for cause or
upon transfer of title or interest.3 4 A transfer is accomplished by
endorsing an assignment, warranty of title and notation of liens on the
back of the instrument,3 5 and forwarding it to the department, which
then issues a new certificate showing any liens or encumbrances. 36 The
same procedure is followed for a lienholder's release or assignment of
his interest to the owner.37
No certificates are needed for new automobiles held by manufac-
turers or dealers,3 8 but upon sale to other parties applications must be
forwarded to the department. 39 And every vendor of used cars must
accompany delivery of the machine with an endorsed certificate of
title. 40 Other sections of the Act cover keeping of records in the state
agency, 41 their inspection by the public, 42 fees for issuance and trans-
fer of certificates, 43 and monthly reports by manufacturers and dealers
of vehicle transfers.44 Operation of an automobile for which no certifi-
Id. §20-57(d).
'Id. §20-57(f).34Id. §20-57(h).
'
0 Id. §20-72(b).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-73. Where transferor is a conditional vendor
or mortgagor he may then forward the certificate to department for recording
of the lien. Id. §20-72(b). Where transferee is a dealer he need not forward
until resale of the car. Id. §20-75. If certificate is lost or unlawfully detained
the department may issue a new one upon proper application. Id. §20-76. §20-77
provides for transfers by operation of law, such as bankruptcy, execution sale,
repossession by vendor; transfers by inheritance, devise or bequest; and notice
of sale under mechanics lien.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-58(a), 20-59.
sId. §§20-51, 20-79(b). Several states require the delivery of a manufac-
turer's or importer's certificate of origin upon sale of a new automobile to dealer,
and the assignment of this certificate to a purchaser from the dealer. NEB.
CouP. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) §§60-1002, 4, 5; OHio GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page,
1938) §§6290-2, 4, 5; TEX. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1,
§§28, 29.
" N. C. GEx. STAT. (1943) §20-52. Both the dealer and purchaser fill out,
the application form, thus insuring a double check on the amount and nature
of any lien created.
"0 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-221. A statute requiring sellers of used cars
brought in from other states to post bonds to save purchasers harmless from title
failures and assessing a ten dollar fee for each bond filed was declared uncon-
stitutional as an interference with interstate commerce. Id. §§20-220, 20-222,
20-223; McLain v. Hoey, 19 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.C. 1937).
"1 Registration and title certificates are filed by registration number, owner's
name and engine number, and these records are checked prior to any vehicle
registration. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-55, 20-56. All applications and sur-
rendered certificates of title are retained to permit tracing of title. Id. §20-78.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-43.
" Id. §20-85 (fifty cents for each new certificate).
"Id. §20-82.
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cate has been issued is made unlawful, 45 and penalties are provided
for this and other violations of the statute.46
In 'view of these comprehensive provisions for lien recording it is
not surprising that the argument was soon advanced that the statement
of mortgages and conditional sales on a certificate of title was sufficient
notice to third parties. The court answered this contention in Carolina
Discount Corporation v. Landis Motor Cornpany47 by declaring the
Act "a police regulation to protect the public from fraud, imposition and
theft of motor vehicles, ' 48 and holding that it did not repeal by impli-
cation the general registration acts.49 This decision is in accord with
the'refusal of other courts to construe similar statutes as recording
•acts, 50 except where a contrary legislative intent is clear.5 1
However, the legislative trend has been toward utilization of certifi-
cates of title as the exclusive method of recording liens on automobiles,
as well as aids in recovery of stolen vehicles and administration of state
taxes.52 Today fifteen states and the District of Columbia make the
certificates constructive notice of liens and encumbrances, and exempt
mortgages on automobiles from the general recording acts. 8 The
" Id. §20-111 (a).
"Old. §§20-176, 20-177. See also §§20-39, 20-59, 20-71, 20-74, 20-108, 20-111,
20-112.
1"190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925). The case involved the original
certificate of title act, N. C. PuB. LAws 1923, c. 236, but its provisions are
basically those of the present statute.
"Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 160, 129
S. E. 414, 416 (1925).
"'After deciding that defendant purchaser from the mortgagor was owner
of the automobile, the court suggested that the superior court could properly
order plaintiff to deliver the certificate of title to defendant. Id. at 161, 129
S. E. at 417 (1925). For the same results by an action to recover possession
of the certificate, see Fogle v. General Credit, 122 F. (2d) 45 (App. D. C. 1941)
Associates Discount Corp. v. Hardesty, 122 F. (2d) 18 (App. D. C. 1941).
" Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v. Faunkhauser, 65 F. (2d) 655 (App, D. C.
1933); in re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 687 (D. Md. 1928); L. B. Motors, Inc. v.
Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E. (2d) 129 (1940); Nelson v. Viergiver,
230 Mich. 38, 203 N. W. 164 (1925); Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120
Ohio St. 568, 166 N. E. 808 (1929) ; Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren State
Bank, 117 Ohio St. 69, 158 N. E. 81 (1927); King-Godfrey v. Rogers, 157
Okla. 216, 11 P. (2d) 935 (1932); accord, Amick v. Exchange State Bank,
164 Minn." 136, 204 N. W. 639 (1925). Cf. Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co.
v. Skaug, 4 Wash. (2d) 46, 102 P. (2d) 227 (1940). Note (1932) 8 NoTs
DAME LAWYER 97.
"lin re Berlin, 147 F. (2d) 491 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1945); It re Wiegand, 27 F.
Supp. 725 (S. D. Cal. 1939) ; Van Syckle v. Keats, 125 N. J. L. 319, 15 A. (2d)
321 (1940); Commercial Credit Co. v. Amer. Mfg. Co., 155 S. W. (2d) 834
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
" Legis. (1936) 12 Wis. L. REv. 92.
" ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §66-231; CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943) Vehicle
Code §§195-8; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §5574(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943)
§319.15; MiCE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) §9.1497 (applies to acces-
sories only); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §1758.3;
NEB. Comp. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) §60-1009, as amended by NEB. Ssss.
LAWS 1943, c. 134, §4; NEv. Comp. LAWS (Supp. 1931-41) §4435, as amended by
NEv. STAT. 1945, c. 240, §§15(a)-(g); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) §39:10-14 (con-
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great need is of course uniformity throughout the nation, and there
have been demands for a national registration system.54 However, an
effective state-wide recording system supplies uniformity within the
state, and through its tie-up with state registration plates and certifi-
cates of title provides real notice and protection to out of state pur-
chasers and creditors.
In order to simplify automobile financing, protect innocent parties,
preserve the security interest of conditional vendors and mortgagees,
and eliminate opportunities for fraud, the following provisions should
be added to the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act :55
1. No mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention
contract, or other lien or encumbrance 56 on or covering a motor
vehicle or on any equipment or accessories affixed or sold to be affixed
to such vehicle shall be valid as against creditors or subsequent pur-
chasers or encumbrances but from its registration in compliance with
section 2 to 6 of this act.5 7
2. There shall be deposited with the register of deeds in the
county where such instrument is executed a copy of the instrument
evidencing such lien or encumbrance, with an attached oT endorsed
certificate of a notary public, accompanied by the certificate of title
last issued for such vehicle, or if no certificate has been issued there-
ditional sales only); N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) §§W8-113-9, as amended by N. M.
LAws 1943, c. 73, §§8, 10; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) §6290-9; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 75, §§33, 38; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE
(Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1, §§41-5; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §§57-3a-
80-7; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942) §2154(64)(b); D. C
CODE (1940) §40-702.
In addition to these states, seventeen states, including North Carolina, require
certificates of title for motor vehicles, but do not make notation of liens on the
certificates constructive notice. Legis. (1936) 12 Wis. L. REV. 92.
r Isaacs, Installment Selling: The Relation Between Its Development it
Modern Business and the Law, (1935) 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoB. 140 at 146.
Upholding the constitutionality of similar acts are State v. Taggart, 134
Ohio St. 374, 17 N. E. (2d) 758 (1938) and In re Fell, 16 F. Supp. 987
(E. D. Pa. 1936).
"This would include trust receipts used in the purchase of motor vehicles.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767
(1928).
"'Just as under present recording acts this would leave an unregistered
mortgage good between the parties. See discussion of Virginia statute in Janney
v. Bell, 111 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The amendment would not
make the certificate of title conclusive as to ownership of the car. The statutes
of California, Iowa, Kansas Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Utah
provide that every transfer oi title or interest in a motor vehicle is void unless
in compliance with the certificate of title act. Notes (1939) 37 Micu. L. Ray.
758, (1935) 94 A. L. R. 948. This strict title registration system represents a
radical departure from the normal requirements of a valid sale or transfer of
personal property, and tends to produce more uncertainty and litigation than at
present; it is not considered advisable for this jurisdiction. However, an amend-
ment to the Act making certificates of title prina facie evidence of title would
promote regularity and reliability of title papers without the disadvantages of a
rigid system of registration.
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for, by an application by the owner for an original certificate of title.
Upon receipt of the above documents in proper order the register of
deeds shall endorse thereon the date and hour received, and shall
collect a registration fee, which shall be uniform throughout the state.
On the same day on which received, the register of deeds shall for-
ward said documents, together with such part of the fee charged as
may be prescribed by statute, to the department of motor vehicles
for filing and recording of the lien or encumbrance upon the certifi-
cate of title. Further filing or registration in the office of register
of deeds shall not be required nor of legal effect.
3. Upon receipt of the copy of the instrument evidencing a lien
or encumbrance and the certificate of title or application therefor,
the department shall file .the same, and shall issue a new certificate of
title in usual form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of
all liens and encumbrances certified to the department against said
vehicle. The department shall maintain an appropriate index of all
lien, encumbrance or title retention instruments filed, and shall fur-
nish upon request information on liens and encumbrances against
motor vehicles.58
4. Such filing and the issuance -of a new certificate of title shall
constitute the exclusive method of giving constructive notice of all
mortgages, deeds of trust, conditional sale or title retention contracts
or other liens or encumbrances against the vehicle described therein,5 9
and such mortgages and other instruments shall be exempt from the
provisions of sections 47-20 and 47-23 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina. Provided, that if the documents referred to above
are received and time 'of receipt endorsed thereon by the register
"To provide for instances of loss caused by departmental errors in issuing
and transferring certificates of title, recording liens and furnishing information,
the department should be required to set up an insurance fund for payment to
injured parties. See Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance
Corp., 164 Va. 579, 180 S. E. 408 (1935) for an example of such a loss.
" It may be wise to provide specifically for mechanics' liens created by N. C.
Gar. STAT. (1943) §44-2. By judicial construction of this statute a mechanic's
lien on a motor vehicle is superior to the lien of a recorded mortgage or condi-
tional sales contract. Reich v. Triplett, 199 N. C. 678, 155 S. E. 573 (1930);
Johnson v. Yates, 183 N. C 24, 110 S. E. 603 (1922) (in a strong dissent Clark,
C. J., argues that the decision permits the mortgagor to "improve the owner
out of his property"); Carolina Sales Co. v. White, 183 N. C. 671, 110 S. E.
607 (1922); cf, Willis v. Taylor, 201 N. C. 467, 160 S. E. 487 (1931); Twin
City Motor Co. v. Rouger Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371, 148 S. E. 461 (1929);
Notes (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 127, (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 762, (1934) 88
A. L. R. 1185, (1936) 104 A. L. R. 267. A suggested provision: "Liens and
encumbrances noted upon certificates of title shall have priority over any other
liens against such motor vehicle, however created or recorded, except the
mechanics' lien for repairs given by §44-2 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, to the extent of fifty ($50) dollars." See CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943)
Vehicle Code §425; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942)
§2154(64) (b).
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of deeds within six days after date said documents were excuted,
constructive notice shall date from the time of execution, otherwise
from the time of receipt as shown by the endorsement of the register
of deeds thereon.
5. The holder or owner of every mortgage, deed of trust, condi-
tional sale or title retention contract or other lien or encumbrance on
any vehicle registered in another state and filed or recorded in that
state shall within ninety days after such vehicle is removed to this
state file with the department of motor vehicles the original or a certi-
fied copy of such mortgage or other instrument. Every mortgage or
other such instrument not so filed shall be subject to any lien or
encumbrance against such vehicle thereafter filed with the department
according to this act, provided said vehicle shall have continuously
remained in this state for said period of ninety days. ,
6. This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the
date of its ratification, except that it shall not affect the validity of
any mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention con-
tract, or other lien or encumbrance on a motor vehicle which was exe-
cuted and registered according to law at the date of such ratification.
But all such mortgages and other instruments not filed with the de-
partment within a period of six months after said date of ratifica-
tion shall be subject to liens and encumbrances thereafter filed against
such vehicle.
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Causes-
Removal by an Automobile
A considerable contribution to legal animism is made by a recent
opinion of a Federal District Court sitting in South Carolina.' A
state statute2 provides that when a motor vehicle is operated in viola-
tion of law or negligently one thereby sustaining personal injuries or
property damage has a lien on the vehicle for his damages and may
attach it in the manner provided for other attachments.3 A native son
was killed in an automobile accident and his administrator brought
action in the State Court for $25,000 against the car's owner (who was
apparently also its driver) and, pursuant to South Carolina practice,
against the car itself. The owner was served -personally and the car
was attached. The car was licensed in Pennsylvania, of which state
"Weatherford v. Radcliffe et al., 63 F. Sunp: 107 (D.C.S.C. 1945). The
"al." is "one Sport Model four-door. Ford Automobile, 1944 Pennsylvania
License No. IFC76."
'Code of Laws of S. C. (1942) §8792.
a This statute has been in force, without amendment, since 1912. It refers
to damages to "a buggy or wagon or other property."
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the individual defendant was a citizen. The individual defendant se-
cured removal to Federal District Court. The Judge of that Court
remanded, the controlling factor being that the automobile had not
joined in the removal petition.
The result thus rests upon the concept of the motor vehicle as a
legal person. Once this hurdle is taken, the opinion lays down the
propositions: (1) that the individual defendant and the automobile were
joint tort feasors; (2) that there was thus no separable controversy ;4
and (3) that the rule applying in such cases is that all defendants must
join in the removal petition.5
Considerable attention is devoted to the fact that the suit against the
car is an in ren; proceeding, the opinion pointing 9ut that libels in
admiralty and under forfeiture statutes are such proceedings with which
Federal courts are familiar. "In an in ren case the thing sued may be
represented and appear in court and defend and exercise all rights it
may have. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant auto-
mobile would have had a right to file a petition or join in a petition for
removal." 6 The creation of personality for the vehicle is then carried
to its logical conclusion: "I hold: 1. That there is diversity of citizen-
ship between the plaintiff and defendants .... 7
Wisely, the opinion makes no attempt to draw an analogy between
the automobile and a corporation. While concededly there are intellec-
tual difficulties in clothing a corporation with citizenship for diversity
purposes, its normally recognized powers to sue and be sued, to own
property, to enter into contracts and to carry on business generally,
present a much stronger claim for the privilege than can be made for
the automobile. However, the Court's apparent reliance on an analogy
to admiralty and forfeiture cases furnishes even less support for the
result. No ship has yet been made a citizen of a State and when the
United States sues 75 tubs of butter it does not endow either the tubs
or the butter with citizenship. Obviously diversity jurisdiction is not
involved in such cases.8 To concede that an inanimate object may be
' That there is no separable controversy when it appears from the complaint
that defendants are joint tort feasors is the general rule in negligence cases.
HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACrICE (1931) §2377. The South Carolina Court has held
that when an individual and car are sued jointly, the individual can remove the
case against him to the county of his residence, leaving the case against the car
in the county of attachment. Ackerman v. One Mack Truck and Trailer, 191
S. C. 74, 3 S. E. (2d) 684 (1939); Mahon v. Burkett, 160 S. C. 48, 158 S. E.
141 (1931). Despite discussion of jurisdiction in these opinions, the Federal
Court in the principal case correctly held that they actually dealt with venue,
not jurisdiction.
'This is the general rule. DOBIE,,HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1928) §93.
663 F. Supp. 107, 111. 63 F. Supp. 107, 112.
' Cf. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206 (1878), approv-
ing removal, on diversity grounds, of a condemnation proceeding brought by a
corporation clothed by state statute with power of eminent domain. The diversity
found, of course, was between the plaintiff corporation and the property owner.
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treated for some purposes as a defendant in a law suit is one thing.
To say that it thus acquires citizenship is under some suspicion of being
a non sequitur.
When a result like this is reached, some search for an explanation
outside of the reasoning in the opinion is in order, but in this' case it
is none too fruitful.
One possibility is that the Judge was led astray by defendant's
counsel. The opinion indicates, without intimating the tactical reason,
that the individual defendant's counsel believed the case against the car
should remain in the State Court.9 Thus apparently neither side was
attempting to have the entire case litigated in Federal Court (though
it also appears that the answer filed in Federal Court by the same coun-
sel was a joint answer for the individual and the car). In this some-
what confused situation it is doubtful that tactics of counsel should be
seized upon to absolve the Court of so patent a departure from reality.
A second possibility is that the Judge was enforcing a policy of re-
stricting diversity jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible. There
is some language which might be so construed.' ° However, if this
was the objective, a much more adequate solution would have been to
say flatly that the automobile, though a party, cannot be a citizen of a
state and hence there could be no removal.'1 Further, the opinion pur-
ports to confine itself to the specific facts; and it will not operate to
'Counsel may possible have had in mind some notion of getting two bites at
the cherry, while confining the opposition to one, by some non-mutual application
of res judicata. However, the joint answer in Federal Court seems inconsistent
with such a notion. The petition for removal alleged that there was a separable
controversy and counsel so argued in opposition to the motion to remand, relying
on the distinction between an action in personam against the individual and one
in- ren against the car. This, also, is inconsistent with the position that the
case against the car should remain in State Court, as ordinarily the entire case
is removed when a separable controirersy is found to exist.
"0 "The Removal Statutes must be strictly construed and due regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments requires that federal courts
scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits of their statutory
authority." 63 F. Supp. 107, 111.1L Prior to the April 20, 1940, amendment to 28 U. S. C. A. §41 citizens of
the District of Columbia could not qualify as citizens of a State for diversity
purposes. And in Ralya Market Co. v. Armour & Co., 102 F. 530 (C. C. Iowa
1900), it was held that a partnership, sued in the firm name under authority
of a state statute, was not a citizen and the case could not be removed, at least
in the absence of an application to the State Court by the individual partners
to be substituted for the firm as defendants. In McLaughlin v. Hallowell, 228
U. S. 278, 33 Sup. Ct. 465, 57 L. ed. 835 (1913), a similar result was reached
by the lower Federal Court and the State Court subsequently denied the adppli-
cation of the partners to be substituted as defendants. Thus no removal was
ever permitted, but the U. S. Supreme Court did not pass on the merits of the
lower Federal Court's order of remand. The more usual result in partnership
cases is -to allow the citizenship of the partners to govern. Raphael v. Trask,
194 U. S. 272, 24 Sup. Ct. 647, 48 L. ed. 973 (1904) ; Great Southern Fire
Proof 'Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 499, 20 Sup. Ct. 690, 44 L. ed. 842 (1900).
Of course, refusing to allow removal because of non-citizenship of the auto-
mobile would still emphasize the legal entity of the vehicle as contrasted with the
citizenship of the owner.
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prevent removal in any case duplicating its facts, provided only that
the car joins in the petition. So, if this confinement of the reach of the
opinion is to be taken at face value, a desire to restrict diversity juris-
diction was not the motivating cause of the result. However, the
reasoning involved might operate to prohibit removal of cases with
different facts-for instance, when the car is registered in South Caro-
lina. (This is just a suggestion, as the available data do not yet furnish
reliable criteria for determination of the citizenship of an automobile.)
Probably the most important factor in the decision is the simple
fact that the South Carolina practice sanctions naming the car as a
defendant. This apparently lead the Judge to overlook the obvious
analogy to actions in which, while only individuals are named as de-
fendants, property is attached, either as a basis for jurisdiction or as
ancillary to personal service. 12 In fact, it is difficult to see why the
principal case is not controlled by the express language of 28 U. S.
C. A. §79: "When any suit shall be removed from a State court to a
district court of the United States, any attachment or sequestration of
the goods or estate of the defendant had in such suit in the State court
shall hold the goods or estate so attached or sequestered to answer the
final judgment or decree in the same manner as by law they would have
been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by
the court in which said suit was commenced." This statute is not cited
in the opinion.
On the facts of the instant case it seems reasonably clear that the
only true defendant is the individual, that the car is attached simply as
an aid to collection of damages or to encourage settlement, and that the
state practice of naming the car as a defendant should not entail con-
sideration of its citizenship or its participation in the removal petition.
The obvious next question is how to treat a case in which the driver
and owner of the car are different people. Even there, if both are sued
for personal judgment, the owner being joined on a theory of imputed
negligence, or if the owner is sued on such an imputation without
joinder of the driver, attachment should not prevent consideration of
the removal question solely on the basis of the citizenship of and
requests made by the individual defendants or defendant.
If the non-driving owner is not named as a defendant,18 other ques-
tions are raised.' 4 It still seems reasonably clear that, as far as the
2 It has been held that when the State Court's jurisdiction is based on attach-
ment, the case can be removed to Federal Court even though, had the case origi-
nated in Federal Court, jurisdiction could not have been predicted solely on the
attachment. Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup. Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906).
See also Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd., 307 U. S. 299, 59 Sup. Ct. 877, 83
L. ed. 1303 (1939).
8 The South Carolina Court has held that the car may be sued without making
the owner, operator or other person a party defendant. Tolbert v. Buick Car,
142 S. C. 362, 140 S. E. 693 (1927)
", Where driver and car are joined, there is perhaps an argument that the
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action against the car is concerned, the governing citizenship should
be that of the owner, just as it would be in an ordinary attachment case
in which an individual defendant, though named as such, cannot be
personally served. 15 However, will shifting the inquiry from citizen-
ship of the car to that of the owner: (1) influence the decision as to
existence of a separable controversy? (2) influence the finding as to
jurisdictional amount?
The principal case would still answer the first question by saying
that there is a joint tort. It is, therefore, necessary to go one step
further in depersonalizing the automobile. What is needed here is an
approach typified by the old gag about the sheep's legs. .Question: "If
you call a sheep's tail a leg, how many legs will it have?" Answer:-
"Four. You can't make a tail a leg by calling it one." That the car
is the instrument by which a tort is committed is obvious, but that it
can be a tort feasor, joint or several, for the purpose of determining
removability does not follow. (At least, it is assumed that we are
unlikely to arrive at a rule of law that an automobile is liable if, under
all the circumstances, it fails to conduct itself as would a reasonably
prudent automobile.)
What the South Carolina legislature has actually done is to provide
that a car owner whose car is driven negligently to plaintiff's damage
is liable to the plaintiff to the extent of his interest in the. car, regard-
less of whether he could be adjudged negligent or otherwise held respon-
attachment is merely ancillary and the driver alone can remove. If it prevailed,
it would furnish a relatively simple rule, eliminating further questions as to
separable controversy and jurisdictional amount. However, since the property
attached would not be the property of the removing defendant, and the action
against it is in reality one to foreclose the rights of its owner, the attachment
seems hardly to be ancillary to the case against the driver. It is doubtful, indeed,
if it would be so held if the owner appears, either for himself or in the name
of the car, and objects to removal or his citizenship would, if controlling, prevent
removal. On the other hand, wherever personal judgment is sought against the
owner, the attachment -is probably properly regarded as ancillary to the case
against him, though the question may be of no practical importance in the absence
of other claimants to rights in the car.
The statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §79, quoted in the text, does not authorize removal
by driver alone, as it presupposes a proper basis for removal, and the question at
issue is whether such basis is present when the car owner can not or does not
join in the petition. Further, its reference to the property of the defendant
probably means property of the defendant requesting removal.
" If the owner does not appear in the case, it might be treated in the same
way as a case in which two defendants are named, but one is not served and does
not appear. The rule there is that if the defendant not served is a non-resident,
the other (also a nonresident) may remove alone; but if he is a resident, the other
may not remove in the absence of a separable controversy. Pullman Co. v. Jen-
kins, 305 U. S. 534, 59 Sup. Ct. 347, 83 L. ed. 334 (1939). That this rule might
apply even where the property of the defendant not served has been attached, is
indicated by Hunt v. Pearce, 284 F. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). 'However, even if
these cases apply generally in the situation under discussion, their rule could not
apply when the owner appears or is a co-citizen with plaintiff. An appearance
nominally made on behalf of the car should be treated, for this purpose, as an
appearance by the owner.
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sible under common law principles. 16 Plaintiff's rights against the
owner may still turn on his rights against the driver, since he has no
lien unless the car was being driven negligently or in violation of law.
But that dependence does not alone render the driver and owner joint
tort feasors or create a master-servant or principal-agent relation be-
tween them in the common law sense. The separable controversy deci-
sion should turn on these considerations rather than on the pat assump-
tion that driver and car are joint tort feasors.17
As to the jurisdictional amount, the instant case holds that removal
can be had, if the car joins in the petition, regardless of the fact that
the car is not worth more than $500. "Both defendants have been
served and the amount of damages alleged is over the sum of $3,000,
and although one defendant can not respond in payment of a verdict
that may be obtained of more than $3,000, that does not alter the fact
that the amount sued for is the amount actually in controversy what-
ever may be the financial responsibility or the liability of the respective
defendants."us This, except for the word "liability," sounds like a
further personalization-an analogy to an insolvent individual. If that
is to be followed, it would apply equally well (and equally inappro-
priately) to the case of the non-driving owner. The opinion apparently
approves an unreported decision from the same District holding that
where the only individual sued was not served, and bond of $1,000
was substituted for the vehicle, the jurisdictional amount was not pres-
ent. However, the opinion furnishes no clue to whether that rule
would also be applied to the case of the non-driving owner if the
defendant driver is personally served.
Again the only realistic approach is to look at the owner of the car.
He is obviously not in the situation of an insolvent defendant. The
only relief sought against him is the application of the value of the
car; and this is pretty clearly the "amount in controversy" as between
plaintiff and the owner.19 The case should be decided in the same way
' The statute contains an exception for cases in which "the motor vehicle shall
have been stolen by the breaking of a building under a secure lock, or when the
vehicle is securely locked."
"7 Though there are master and servant cases holding that a separable contro-
versy is present when one defendant's liability is predicated on a statute and the
other's liability on the common law-see HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE (1931)
§2381-the rule announced by the Supreme Court seems to be that if State
decisions hold the defendants jointly liable there is no separable controversy,
regardless of this feature. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U. S.
184, 33 Sup. Ct. 250, 57 L. ed. 473 (1913); Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 217
U. S. 209, 30 Sup. Ct. 450, 54 L. ed. 732 (1910). Cf. concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, supra note 15.
s63 F. Supp. 107. 111.
"° It has been held that when jurisdiction is based on attachment the amount
sued for controls, even though the value of the property attached is less than
the jurisdictional amount. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co.,
285 F. 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Gershowitz v. Lane Cotton Mills, 21 F. Supp.
579 (D. C. Tex. 1937) ; Randall v. Becton-Dickinson Co., 18 F. (2d) 631 (D. C.
Mass. 1927). However, at this point the analogy between the ordinary attach-
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as any other case in which there are several defendants and the relief
sought against one does not equal the jurisdictional amount.20
It may be conceded that the approach herein suggested does not
automatically furnish clear answers to all the questions which may
arise, and even that some confusion could creep into cases resting on
such an approach. However, endowing the automobile with citizen-
ship, the ability to commit a tort, and net worth will not eliminate the
confusion, but merely confound it.
Something might be made over the fact that, if this case continues
to be good law, there are multiple opportunities for enlarging its appli-
cation. The statutory idea can be readily applied to the pistol with
which plaintiff is shot, the factory which omits noxious fumes, the
scaffold which collapses under the plaintiff, or any other property instru-
mental in the commission of a tort.2 1  Indeed, it might be possible to
allow the property to be named as a defendant in every attachment
suit and even in actions to foreclose mortgages or to quiet title.
2 2
Foreign corporations, not now barred from removal because their
stockholders are co-citizens with plaintiff, might be barred because their
real estate and manifold chattels are.23  And there would, perforce, be
a great blossoming of the law on the locus of citizenship of property.
It is pretty obvious that this is not going to happen; and, very probably,
as part of the history of its non-happening, the instant case will be
repudiated. HENRY BRANDIS, JR.
ment case and the case of the non-driving owner breaks down. In the latter
the relief sought, when there is no imputed negligence alleged, can never exceed
the value of the car. In a rare case plaintiff might allege damages less than the
value of the car, and in such case the damages alleged should govern. A com-
parable situation is found in the lien cases holding that the amount of the claim,
not the value of the property, controls. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz,
262 U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 480,- 67 L. ed. 871 (1923); City of Pawhuska v. Mid-
land Valley R. Co., 33 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A 8th, 1929).
20 The decision would, under the cases, turn on whether owner's and driver's
liabilities to plaintiff are "joint" or "several"-also stated as whether they have
a "common and undivided interest." McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415, 25 Sup.
Ct. 369, 49 L. ed. 533 (1905) ; Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370,
13 Sup. Ct. 348, 37 L. ed. 206 (1893) ; Stemmler v. McNeill, 102 F. 660 (C. C.
N. C. 1900). See also Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. ed.
1044 (1891). This question, therefore, involves something of the same consider-
ations as are involved in determining whether there is a separable controversy.
If both decisions are controlled by -the same considerations, then: (1) If there
is a "joint" liability, there is no separable controversy, but jurisdictional amount
is present. Hence there would be no removal if the owner is a co-citizen with
plaintiff or does not join in the petition. (2) If there is "several" liability, there
is a separable controversy and the driver alone, if a nonresident, could remove.
2 Perhaps somewhere along the line there would be a due process limitation
on such absolute liability statutes.
"
2Due process would hardly be a bar here, since there is no question about
the validity of the underlying cause of action and the right to proceed by attach-
ment is clearly recognized. There might be trouble if the statute could be said
to be intended primarily to defeat Federal jurisdiction. See Terral v. Burke
Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 4Z. Sup. Ct. 188, 66 L. ed. 352, 21 A. L. RL 186 (1922).
2" There are some, of course, who advocate restricting or eliminating the right
of foreign corporations to remove to Federal Court, but none has been found
who based his advocacy on the citizenship of the corporate property.
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